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Developing countries have urbanized rapidly since 1950. To explain urbanization, standard models emphasize ruralurban migration, focusing on rural push factors (agricultural modernization and rural poverty) and urban pull factors (industrialization and urban-biased policies). Using new historical data on urban birth and death rates for seven countries from Industrial Europe (1800-1910) and thirty-five developing countries , this paper argues that a non-negligible part of developing countries' rapid urban growth and urbanization may also be linked to demographic factors, such as rapid internal urban population growth, or an urban push. High urban natural increase in today's developing countries follows from lower urban mortality, relative to Industrial Europe, where higher urban deaths offset urban births. This compounds the effects of migration and displays strong associations with urban congestion, providing additional insight into the phenomenon of urbanization without growth.
INTRODUCTION
Urban expansion in the developing world has been dramatic, both in absolute and relative terms. Between 1950 and 2015, the total urban population in developing countries increased tenfold from about 300 million to 3 billion, while the urban share tripled from about 17 to 50 percent (United Nations, 2013). There are many similarities with the urbanization process of developed countries in the 19th century. Yet, there are also important differences.
First, urban growth has been substantially faster in today's developing world. In Europe, urbanization accelerated with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, rising from 15% in 1800 to 40% in 1910. Both Africa and Asia reached the same rate in half the time, moving from 15% in 1950 to ∼40% in 2010. Second, while urbanization is positively correlated with income across countries (Henderson, 2010) , the world is becoming more and more urbanized at a constant income level (Glaeser, 2013; Jedwab & Vollrath, 2015b) . In 1960, the 35 countries whose income per capita was less than $2 a day had an average urbanization rate of 15% (WDI, 2013) . In 2010, the 34 countries with comparable incomes had an average urbanization rate of 30%. So, why has post-1950 urban expansion in the developing world been so fast and does the speed of urban growth matter for the people's welfare?
Standard models explain urbanization largely by rural-urban migration in response to an expected urban-rural wage or utility gap (Harris & Todaro, 1970; Lall, Selod & Shalizi, 2006) .
Migration flows could be the result of a rural push. If the country experiences a Green
Revolution, the rise in food productivity releases labor for the urban sector (Schultz, 1953; Gollin, Parente & Rogerson, 2002) . Rural poverty due to land pressure or natural disasters causes rural migrants to search for better lives in the cities (Barrios, Bertinelli & Strobl, 2006; da Mata et al., 2007; Henderson, Storeygard & Deichmann, 2013) . Then there are various urban pull factors. If the country experiences an Industrial Revolution, the urban wage increases, which attracts workers from the countryside (Lewis, 1954; Lucas, 2004; Henderson, Roberts & Storeygard, 2013) . If the government adopts urban-biased policies, urban utility also increases (Henderson, 1982; Ades & Glaeser, 1995; Davis & Henderson, 2003) . A country that exports natural resources also urbanizes if the resource rents are spent on urban goods and services (Gollin, Jedwab & Vollrath, 2013; Jedwab, 2013; Cavalcanti, Mata & Toscani, 2014) . While the Green Revolution, Industrial Revolution and resource export theories find that urbanization is associated with development, the rural poverty and urban bias theories imply that urbanization occurs "without growth" (Fay & Opal, 2000) .
The aforementioned theories remain silent on the role of demography in the urbanization 1 process. This paper takes a historically comparative and demographic oriented approach to understanding some key features of urbanization in today's developing world. We show that in many cities, mortality has fallen to low levels, due to the epidemiological transition of the 20th century, while fertility has remained high. The resulting high rate of natural increase in urban areas compounds the effects of migration on urban growth. Today's "mushroom cities" are in contrast to the "killer cities" of Industrial Europe, where high urban mortality rates offset the (lower) urban birth rate, resulting in much lower urban natural increase. The concept of "urban push" (rather than "rural push" or "urban pull") is used to describe this demographic mechanism of urbanization and its implications in a three step analysis. 1 In particular, we carefully document and decompose urban growth in industrializing Europe and developing countries. To do so, we created an extensive new data set on the crude rates of birth and death for urban and rural areas of 7 European (or Neo-European) countries in the 19th century (every forty years in and 35 countries that were still developing countries in 1960 (every ten years in 1960-2010) . 2 We show that the fast absolute growth of cities in today's developing world was also driven by urban natural increase, rather than solely by migration as in Europe. The difference in urban rates of natural increase then drove the urban population in today's developing world to double every 18 years, compared with 35 years in Europe. Simulations further suggest that urban natural increase also accelerated the change in urbanization rates, i.e. the relative growth of cities.
By way of extension, we explore whether the contributions of urban natural increase to urban growth and urbanization hold beyond an accounting sense using multivariate regressions.
Decadal country level rates of urban growth and urbanization are regressed on urban natural increase, with controls for income growth, rural push and urban pull factors, and regional characteristics for the panel of 35 developing countries . Urban natural increase remains strongly associated with urban growth and urbanization. We then study whether these short-run decadal effects also hold in the longer run (a few decades later). Ruralto-urban migration could eventually slow down in response to urban natural increase or urban residents may adjust their fertility behavior. However, the observed long-run effects are not significantly different from the short-run effects. These results suggest that urban natural increase has compounded the effects of migration, accelerating urban growth and urbanization in the developing world vis-à-vis what was observed in Industrial Europe.
This finding also raises a number of additional questions, which the paper briefly reflects upon.
First, do the speeds of urban growth and urbanization matter? Second, why do migration rates 1 While the former two concepts imply that rural workers are pushed to (or pulled to) cities by changes in rural (urban) conditions, the latter suggests that cities growing internally are pushing their own boundaries.
2 Economic historians have focused individually either on England or the U.S. in the 19th century (Williamson, 1990; Haines, 2008) . Our vastly expanded dataset thus allows us to significantly extend their work.
not adjust (more) in response to this rapid urban natural increase and higher congestion?
Finally why do urban fertility rates not come down faster? To shed some light on the first question, the link between the speed of urban growth and urban congestion is explored using a novel cross-sectional data set of urban congestion measures for 95 developing countries . Higher urban growth due to natural increase is associated with more congested cities today. Interestingly, the corresponding effects of migration on urban congestion tend to be much smaller. We then discuss various potential explanations for why rural migration may continue to, and fertility may remain high in, these congested urban areas.
The paper adds to the literature on urbanization and growth. The role of urban natural increase has been recognized by demographers (Rogers, 1978; Preston, 1979; Keyfitz, 1980; Fox, 2012) , but is little discussed in economics (see surveys by Duranton (2008 Duranton ( , 2013 , Henderson (2010) and Desmet & Henderson (2014) ).
3 First, urban natural increase creates a disconnect between urbanization and growth if urban areas expand without an increase in living standards. 4 Second, while there is an extensive literature measuring agglomeration effects in developing countries, little is known about the magnitude of congestion effects.
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The speed of urban growth is an understudied dimension of the urbanization process. Third, whether urban growth is mainly driven by migration or natural increase has implications for policy making. When urban congestion is the result of excessive migration, investment in urban infrastructure may not be justified if it further fuels migration (see Feler & Henderson (2011) for a discussion of urban policies in Brazil). However, if urban growth is due to urban natural increase, the resulting immediate increase in the urban population may necessitate such investment, as well as stronger urban family planning policies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the data and the decompositions results. Sections 3 shows the econometric results. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
3 In a more recent paper, Jedwab & Vollrath (2015a) use a theoretical model to study the "Malthusian" effects of the epidemiological transition on the rise of poor mega-cities. They focus their analysis on the absolute population growth of the largest cities in the world, hence mega-city growth, while here we look at both the absolute and relative growth of the total urban population, hence urban growth and urbanization rates. 4 In countries where urban growth comes from migration, it is likely that urban wages are rising, which given low rural wages attract residents to the cities. Eventually, as the urban-rural income gap closes, rural residents cease migrating to the cities, and the urbanization rate and income stabilize at a higher level. In countries where urban growth comes from urban natural increase, urbanization occurs because poor urban families have high fertility rates. There is also migration if the countryside gets too congested due to rural natural increase. Eventually, there is no urban-rural gap, but the country is more urbanized, although income did not increase. 
MAIN DECOMPOSITION ANALYSIS

Data and Background
We use historical data on urbanization, and urban and rural fertility and mortality. We first reconstruct the urban growth and urbanization rates for 19 European and North American countries from 1700-1950 (∼every 40 years), and 116 African, Asian and non-North American countries that were still developing countries in 1960, from 1900-2010 (∼every 10 years). This allows us to compare the urbanization process of five developing areas: "Industrial Europe"
(which includes the United States in our analysis), Africa, Asia, Latin America (LAC) and the Middle-East and North Africa (MENA). Second, we obtain historical demographic data for 42 countries: 7 European countries for the 1700-1950 period, and 35 countries in Africa (10), Asia (12), the LAC region (8) and the MENA region (12) for the 1960-2010 period. For each country-period observation, we obtain the urban and rural crude rates of birth, death and natural increase (per 1,000 people). We recreated the data using historical sources, as well as the UN Statistical Yearbooks and reports of the Population Census, the Fertility Surveys and the Demographic and Housing Surveys of these countries. 6 We also collect the same type of data for 97 countries that were still developing countries in 1960 for the most recent period.
The most advanced civilizations before the 18th century had urbanization rates of around 10%-15% (Bairoch, 1988) . Industrialization accompanied dramatic urbanization. Figure   1 (top panels) shows the urbanization rates for Industrial Europe (1700-1950) and four developing areas: Africa, Asia, LAC and MENA (1900-2000) . The urbanization rate for Europe was stable (∼10%) until 1800 and increased to ∼40% in 1910 ∼40% in . In 1950 in Africa and Asia were also predominantly rural (urbanization rate ∼15%). By 2010, their urbanization rate had increased to ∼40%. The LAC region had already surpassed the 40% threshold in 1950, while the MENA region did not surpass it until 1970. In our analysis, we focus on the 1800-1910 period for Europe and the 1960-2010 period for Africa and Asia.
During these periods, the urbanization rates of the three areas increased from 15% to 40%. Figure 1 (bottom panels) also shows the urban growth rate for Europe (1700-1950) and the four developing areas from 1900-2010. In the 1800-1910 period, the overall urban growth rate in Europe was 2.2% per year, peaking during the Industrial Revolution. Conversely, the urban growth rate has been ∼3.8% a year in today's developing world post-1960. A 3.8% growth rate implies that cities double every 18 years, while a 2.0% rate means that cities only double every 35 years. These rates peaked in the 1950s/60s, with the acceleration of rural-to-urban migration and the demographic transition.
6 See Web Appx Table 1 for details on the data sources used for each country. 4
Killer vs. Mushroom Cities -Decomposing Urban Expansion
Note that urban and rural population growth can be written as an expression of urban and rural natural increase, internal migration, international migration, and urban reclassification: (1) and (2) can be simplified as:
where M i g t is the number of "residual migrants", defined as the sum of rural migrants and rural residents reclassified as urban. When dividing equation (3) by the urban population at the start of year t, we obtain that the urban growth rate is the sum of the rate of urban natural increase (U ni t ) and the "residual migration" rate (M i g t /U pop t ):
The rate of urban (rural) natural increase Uni t (Rni t ) can be further decomposed as the difference of the Urban (Rural) Crude Birth Rate (UCBR t ) and the Urban (Rural) Crude Death Rate (UCDR t ) (i.e. the number of children born and the number of deaths per 1,000 people in year t). At 35 newborns per 1,000 people before 1910, fertility in Industrial Europe was relatively low, while mortality was high (Figure 2 ), especially in urban areas where death rates exceeded birth rates for much of the 19th century. Promiscuity, industrial smoke and polluted water sources all contributed to the high urban death rate (10 percentage points higher than in rural areas). With many European cities acting as "death sinks" during the 19th century, a phenomenon that became known as Europe's killer cities (Williamson, 1990) ,
Europe experienced an average urban natural increase of only 0.5 percent per year. At 2.2 percent per year during 1800-1910, Europe's urban growth was also relatively low, and, as seen from an application of equation (5), largely accounted for by residual migration: 1.7 percent versus 0.5 percent from urban natural increase (see Figure 2 , bottom panel). 7 Births and deaths are registered using the place of residence. A child who is born in an urban-based family is counted as urban. Likewise, a child that follows her parents when they migrate to a city is counted as a migrant. The numbers of urban newborns and residents are estimated using permanent residence.
8 Web Appendix Table 2 shows the detailed decomposition of urban growth for the seven countries. Urban natural increase in 1800-1910 was 0.5% in England, 0.5% in Belgium, 0.1% in France, 0.6% in Germany, 0.4% in the Netherlands, 0.3% in Sweden and 0.4% in the U.S. It was thus the same whether we consider a country This contrasts with the urban demographic and growth patterns Figure   4 , as well as Web Appx. Within the developing world, differences in urban natural increase across regions are largely driven by differences in fertility, not by differences in mortality, which do not vary much across countries ( Figure 3 and Web Appx Fig 3) . The LAC and MENA regions experienced higher urban natural increase in 1960, and have been completing their fertility transition since. Asia started its transition earlier and Africa still largely finds itself in the early stages. Figure   4 further shows the decompositions for Africa and Asia separately, in addition to Industrial
Europe and today's developing world. To summarize, the difference in urban growth between the developing world and Europe (3.8% vs. 2.2%) comes from differences in urban natural increase (2.3% vs. 0.5%) and not from differences in migration, which averaged 1.5% for developing countries post-1960, a rate similar to that in Industrial Europe (1.7 percent) during 1800 -1910 . Second, differences in urban growth (1960 -2010 within the developing world, such as between Africa and Asia (4.9 percent and 3.5 percent respectively) were also largely due to differences in urban natural increase (2.9 versus 1.7 percent) and much less so due to differences in residual migration rates (2.1 and 1.8 percent respectively). To appreciate the compounding effects of such differences in urban growth rates note that with a migration rate of 1.5% and an urban rate of natural increase of 2.9% (1.7%), as in Africa (Asia), a family of five migrants in 1960 becomes a family of 43 (24) urban residents in 2010.
that received international migrants (the U.S.) or countries where outmigration was strong. 9 Birth rates depend on total fertility rates (TFR) and the population shares of women of reproductive age (SWRA). The urban TFR is the main determinant of urban birth rates (CBR). For 97 countries for which we have data for the recent period, the correlation coefficient between the two is 0.93 (Web Appx. Fig. 1 ). The correlation between the urban CBR and SWRA is lower (-0.40) . When regressing the CBR on the TFR, SRWA and their product, the product explains most of it, while the product is driven by the TFR (Web Appx. Table 4) . 10 The death rate depends on child mortality (age 0-5 years), youth mortality (age 5-15 years) and adult mortality (age 15 and above years). Urban child mortality is the main factor of urban aggregate mortality (Web Appx. Fig. 2 ). In our sample of countries in 2000, the correlation coefficient between the two is 0.81.
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It can then be shown that changes in the urbanization rate depend on the difference between the urban and rural rates of natural increase (see Web Theory Appendix 1). Industrial Europe and the four developing areas had on average similar rural rates of natural increase. But they widely differed in their urban rates of natural increase. While "mushroom villages" have always existed, "mushroom cities" are the novel feature of the 20th century. We show in a calibration exercise that faster changes in urbanization are indeed associated with higher urban rates of natural increase ceteris paribus (see Web Theory Appx Fig. 1 ).
The decompositions suggest that urban natural increase expands the urban population in both absolute terms (the urban growth rate) and relative terms (the change in the urbanization rate). For example, one urban (rural) newborn has an instantaneous effect of 1 on the urban (rural) population. However, in the long run, individuals choose their place of residenceurban vs. rural -depending on their utility in each location. The long-run equilibrium effect of urban natural increase thus depends on urban and rural utility levels, and, ultimately, the endogenous dynamic responses of migration and fertility to the increase in urban population.
The long-term effects of urban natural increase could be smaller than its short-term effects.
If urban newborns eventually crowd-out cities as adults, urban natural increase could have a dissuasive effect on future rural-to-urban migration and/or future urban fertility, further reducing urban growth. However, the long-term effects could also exceed the short-term effects if urban natural increase leads to higher urban fertility, wherein urban congestion and the corresponding low income level prevent any adjustment in fertility, due to the trade-off between child quantity and child quality (Galor, 2012) .
11 To assess the extent to which these decomposition findings stand up to these dynamic adjustments over time as well as additional factors that may jointly affect urban growth and urbanization as well as natural increase, a series of multivariate (panel) specifications are explored. These additional exercises are not meant to establish causality, but rather to provide additional insight into whether the findings hold beyond the transition (i.e. in the longer run) and beyond an accounting sense.
MULTIVARIATE ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
Absolute Urban Growth
We use panel data for 35 countries that were still developing countries in 1960. We adapt equation (5) and run the following model for t = [1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s] :
where U pop c,t /U pop c,t is the annual urban growth rate (%) of country c in decade t. Our variable of interest is the urban rate of natural increase (per 100 people, or %) of country c in decade t (U ni c,t ). We include country and decade fixed effects (γ c ; δ t ). Please note that we cannot include the residual migration rate since urban growth is, by construction, the sum of urban natural increase and residual migration. 15 It can then be shown that the long-term effect is a non-linear combination of the direct effect of urban natural increase in t on urban growth in t, and the indirect effects of 12 The controls are: (i) Green Revolution: average cereal yields (hg per ha) in decade t; (ii) Industrial Revolutions: share of manufacturing and services in GDP (%) 2010 interacted with decade fixed effects (the share is missing for many countries in earlier decades); (iii) resource exports: share of resource exports in GDP (%) in t; (iv) rural poverty: rural density (1000s of rural population per sq km of arable area), number of droughts (per sq km), and a dummy equal to one if the country has experienced a conflict in t; and (v) urban bias: a dummy equal to one if the country's average polity score is lower than -5 (the country is then considered autocratic according to Polity IV), and the primacy rate (%) in t. Including country fixed effects then controls for the fact that countries use different urban definitions, which affects urban reclassification. 13 The regions are Central Africa, East Africa, South Africa, West Africa, East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean, Central America, South America, Middle-East and North Africa.
14 The results hold when instrumenting Uni with the initial religious and family planning conditions for each country in the 1960s, interacted with decade fixed effects, while simultaneously controlling for rural natural increase (Web Appx. Table 5 ). As the main driver of natural increase, the evolution of fertility was influenced by both the dominant religion in each country in the 1960s (fertility remained higher in the Catholic and Muslim countries, see Web Appx. Table 6 ) and whether the country had a anti-natalist policy in the 1960s (Web Appx. Fig. 4 shows how idiosyncratic the adoption of an anti-natalist policy adoption was back then). Thus, fast urban growth did not drive family planning policy adoption (Web Appx. Table 7 ). However, as we cannot be sure that the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction, the IV results should be treated with extreme caution.
15 Following this economic reasoning and the results of the AIC and BIC criteria, which show that the crucial information is contained in the second lag, we omit the first lag. Moreover, the urban rates of natural increase in t and t-1 are highly correlated (rho=0.84), which creates collinearity. The rates in t and t-2 are less correlated (rho=0.70). We cannot include lags beyond t-2, due to insufficient observations. 8 urban natural increase and urban growth in t-2 on urban growth in t.
16 Row (4) shows the implied long-term effect, 1.21 (see Web Appx. Table 8 for the coefficient of each lag). This effect is also not significantly different from one (F-test available upon request).
As an alternative strategy to capture long-run effects, we use cross-sectional regressions for the 35 countries, with the annual urban growth in 1960-2010 as the dependent variable and the urban rate of natural increase in the 1960s as the variable of interest. 17 If the effect of urban natural increase entirely attenuates over time due to endogenous migration and fertility responses, the effect in 1960-2010 of urban natural increase in the 1960s should be nil. The effect is ∼0.69-0.74, depending on whether we control for rural natural increase (rows (5)- (6)), and is not significantly different from one (F-test available upon request).
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To take full advantage of our available data in the recent period (97 countries), we run an additional robustness check, regressing annual urban growth in 1960-2010 on urban natural increase in 2000, a proxy for urban natural increase in 1960-2010 (rows (7)- (8)). The effects remain high, at 0.77-0.80 depending on whether we include rural natural increase in 2000 (row (9)). 19 The long-term effect of urban natural increase thus falls in the range of vs 0.5), its annual urban growth rate would have been 2.1% instead of 3.8% ceteris paribus, and thus the same as in Industrial Europe (2.2%). Likewise, if Africa's urban natural increase had been the same as in Asia in 1960-2010 (2.9 vs 1.7), its annual urban growth rate would have been 3.7% instead of 4.9%, and thus the same as in Asia (3.9%).
16 Greene (2008, p.683-684) shows that the long-term effect of a variable X on a variable Y is equal to the sum of the effects of X and its lags on Y, divided by (1 minus the sum of the effects of each lag of Y on Y), provided Y and X are both stationary, which we confirm using various tests for our analysis (not shown). 17 We add: (i) controls for income and urbanization in 1960, and income in 2010, (ii) region fixed effects, and (iii) controls that are the same as for the panel regressions (see footnote 13), except we use 2010 as the end year or 1960-2010 for the whole period to estimate them. We also control for the urban definition using dummies for each type of definition (administrative, threshold, threshold and administrative, and threshold plus condition) and the population threshold to define a locality as urban when this definition is used, as well as the country's area (sq km), and dummies equal to one if the country is landlocked or a small island (<50,000 sq km).
18 Duranton (2015) finds that the effect of the log birth rate in 1993 on the change in log population between 1993 and 2010 for about 1,000 Colombian municipalities is 0.24, not one. However, there is significant migration across municipalities in Colombia, which attenuates the local effects of natural increase. Our regressions are at the country level, and people cannot migrate across countries as easily, so our effects are higher. 19 We also find a strong effect of the largest city's birth rate in 2000, a proxy for its rate of natural increase in 1960-2010 (death rates unavailable), on its growth rate between 1960-2010 (Web Appx. Table 9 ). However, urban natural increase does not modify urban primacy rates (Web Appx. table 10).
Relative Urban Growth
We now investigate the effects of urban natural increase and residual migration on the change in urbanization, a measure of relative urban growth. We run the following panel model for the same 35 countries and t = [1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s] :
where ∆U c,t is the change in the urbanization rate (in percentage points) of country c in decade t. Our variables of interest are the urban rate of natural increase (U ni c,t ) and the residual migration (M i g c,t ) of country c in decade t (%). All regressions include country and decade fixed effects (θ c ; λ t ) and aforementioned controls (Results in Table 2 ).
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Including region fixed effects and rural natural increase (row (3)), a one percentage point increase in the effect of urban natural increase is associated with a 1.63 increase in the change in the urbanization rate (U t − U t−1 ) (the coefficient of residual migration is 2.06).
Unlike urban growth, urbanization rates are directly affected by rural natural increase, since rural newborns immediately expand the rural population. As urban and rural natural increase are positively correlated, not including rural natural increase leads to a downward bias when estimating the effect of urban natural increase (rows (1)- (2)). The long-term effect then ranges from 1.21 (ADL, row (4)) to 1.66-1.78 (cross-sections in 1960-2010, rows (5)- (6)), while for migration, the range is 1.62-3.28. The effects are not significantly different from the short-term effects (row (3)). The ADL effect is then not significantly different for urban natural increase, but the point estimate remains high. Results also hold if we use the 97 countries for which we have data on natural increase in 2000 (rows (7)- (8)).
These effects are strong, though not necessarily causal. Assuming average long-term effects of about 2.45 ((1.62+3.28)/2) and 1.50 ((1.21+1.78)/2) for migration and urban natural increase, respectively, one standard deviation increases in migration and urban natural increase are respectively associated with a 0.70 and a 0.30 standard deviation increase in the change in urbanization. Migration is the main component of urbanization. Indeed, a migrant decreases the rural population by one and increases the urban population by one. Urban natural increase only increases the urban population, hence the fact that it has a relatively larger effect on urban growth than on urbanization. But it is nonetheless a significant factor in urbanization. For example, Europe's urbanization rate rose by 2.5 percentage points every ten years during the 1800-1910 period, increasing from 15% in 1800 to 40% in 1910. Africa and Asia realized the same performance in half the time, between 1960 and 2010; the decadal change was 4.5 percentage points in Africa and Asia post-1960. On average, urban natural increase was 1.7 percentage points higher in Africa and Asia than in Europe. Given an effect of 1.50, this gives a crude difference of (1.7 x 1.50 =) 2.5 percentage points of urbanization every ten years. Urban natural increase may thus contribute to explaining why today's developing world has urbanized at a much faster pace than the old developing world.
DISCUSSION
Potential Welfare Consequences
Given the high urban rates of natural increase in today's developing world (urban population doubles every 18 years), urban capital (e.g., houses, schools and roads) must grow as fast as the urban population. If not, fast urban growth can lead to urban congestion, which may reduce urban utility. 21 Panel data on the evolution of urban wages and amenities over time do not exist, so we use cross-sectional data on various measures of congestion for the most recent period. Our main measure is the share of the urban population living in slums (%) in 2005-2010. We have data for 113 low-income countries in 1960, but we focus our analysis on 95 countries for which we also have data on natural increase. We first regress the slum share on the urban growth rate and the change in the urbanization rate between 1960 and 2010. We control for income and urbanization in 1960 and 2010 and add the controls and the regional fixed effects. Row (1) of Table 3 shows that slum expansion is associated with the urban growth rate, but not with the change in urbanization. Indeed, what matters for urban congestion is the absolute number of urban residents per sq km. 22 When decomposing urban growth into urban natural increase and residual migration, we find that the slum share today is disproportionately correlated with the urban rate of natural increase in 2000, which is used as a proxy for urban natural increase in 1960-2010 (row (2) ). 23 The same general pattern holds when we choose other measures of congestion reflecting living standards, environmental degradation, and economic sectors (Table 3 , rows (3)- (11)).
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Migration is less associated with urban congestion than urban natural increase. There are a few possible reasons for this. First, many rural workers migrate to the cities where productivity and income are rising. Second, urban natural increase (a disproportionately greater number of children) raises the dependency ratio (rows (1) and (2) of Table 4 ), possibly lowering incomes in the short-run. 25 Third, rising incomes imply that governments have resources to minimize the congestion effects, a point we will return to.
The Puzzling Non-Adjustment of Migration?
The fact that urban natural increase has positive long-run effects on urbanization suggests that on average: (i) rural workers have kept migrating to congested urban areas, and (ii) urban newborns have not migrated out of these cities. What matters for the long-run equilibrium distribution of the population is the urban-rural utility (positive) gap. We reflect on potential explanations, but quantifying their contribution falls beyond the scope of the paper.
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Urban agglomeration effects. The urban wage should increase with the size of the urban population as long as agglomeration effects dominate congestion effects. If congestion outweighs agglomeration, the urban wage decreases, but rural workers will still migrate to, and the urban newborns will still stay in, the urban areas as long as it remains higher than the rural wage. There may still be strong agglomeration effects in our cities.
Rural congestion effects.
In countries where both rural and urban natural increase were high, the rural congestion effects may have been as important as the urban congestion effects.
Web Appendix Tables 13 and 14 show that the speed of urban growth (i.e. urban natural increase), and not the speed of rural growth, is the main determinant of urban congestion.
Likewise, Web Appendix Tables 15 and 16 show that the speed of rural growth (i.e. rural natural increase) is the main determinant of rural congestion (when possible, we use the same outcomes as for urban congestion). Countries where both urban and rural natural increase have been fast have thus become highly congested as a whole, and migration may have remained positive because the countryside remained relatively more congested. The attending school (a proxy for congestion in human capital accumulation); (9) the level of particulate matter (PM) concentrations in the large cities (a proxy for road congestion); and (10)- (11) the urban employment shares of "manufacturing and FIRE" and "personal and other services". The FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate and business services) sector serves as a proxy for tradable services. If cities grow too fast, urban labor demand will not rise as fast as urban labor supply, and the urban newborns will be eventually employed by the low-skill sectors such as "personal and other services" and not the high-skill sectors such as "manufacturing and FIRE". 25 The urban child dependency ratio -the ratio of the number of (0-14 year-old) children to the (15-64 yearold) working population -is much higher in the countries where urban natural increase is high (row (1) of Table  4 ). Then, both urban natural increase and migration reduce the urban aged dependency ratio, the urban ratio of the number of 65 year-old and above people to the working population (row (2)). Since the former effect dominates the latter effect, urban natural increase raises the total dependency ratio (row (3)). 26 A proper model would consider both urban and rural utilities, which both depend on wages and amenities. Then wages and amenities both benefit from agglomeration effects and suffer from congestion effects. The effect of natural increase on the urban-rural utility gap then depends on where it is the fastest, as well as on the respective forms of the agglomeration and congestions effects in both locations. The main factor of production in the rural sector is land, which is non-reproducible, so rural congestion effects could be large. In cities, there are no non-reproducible factors per se, but the "urban space" can become highly congested too. mean comparison for each variable between the urban and rural sectors suggests that this may be the case (see Web Appendix Tables 13 and 15). 27 Urban life expectancy. Europe's killer cities had to offer relatively high wages to urban residents in order to compensate for the fact that they had relatively higher mortality rates than the countryside (Williamson, 1990) . Conversely, urban mortality rates are lower than rural mortality rates in today's developing world, and access to public social services is broader (Ferré, Ferreira & Lanjouw, 2012; Dustmann & Okatenko, 2014) , which gives a direct incentive for rural residents to migrate to, and urban newborns to stay in, the cities.
Preferences. Unlike rural migrants, urban newborns initially have a strong preference for urban living, which increases urban-to-rural migration costs. There could also be a fixed cost for urban-born residents willing to enter the rural sector (acquisition of land and other agricultural capital). Urban newborns may thus prefer to stay in urban areas, even in those that are highly congested. Conversely, rural residents may not have a strong preference for rural living and face a low fixed cost of entering the urban sector.
The Puzzling Non-Adjustment of Urban Fertility?
Urban families are also not adjusting their fertility, although mortality rates have fallen and cities have become congested. One explanation for the high birth rate in fast-growing urban areas may be a high share of women of reproductive age. However, urban birth rates are mostly explained by urban fertility rates rather than by the population share of women of reproductive age (see footnote 9). A youth bulge effect is thus likely a marginal factor.
Alternatively, an important reason why urban fertility may not respond much to urban natural increase and urban congestion may be the fact that fertility rates are high in poor economies with low returns to education (see Galor (2012) for a thorough review of the literature). If congestion prevents these urban economies from developing, and particularly from becoming skill-intensive, urban fertility rates may not adjust. This is consistent with the negative correlation between urban natural increase and urban school attendance (Table 3) .
CONCLUSION
Our analysis has shown that urban natural increase contributes to explaining why the cities of the developing world grew so fast post-1960, and why many of these cities may be highly congested today. Our results have several policy implications. First, any urban population growth slowdown (for example through enhanced family planning programs) could contribute to increasing the urban capital-labor ratio and prevent congestion effects from kicking in. Second, better urban planning could help mitigate the negative externalities 27 Rural natural increase was also high in the old developing world, but its high-mortality cities were eventually able to absorb the rural surplus labor. In the cities of today's developing world, the cities must absorb the surplus labor created by both rural natural increase and their own internal population growth.
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of high urban fertility rates on urban resources. While investing in these cities could further fuel migration, not investing in them could reduce future welfare, since they will continue to grow. Fertility remains high in many developing cities, especially in Africa, and takes time to drop. An important corollary question then becomes which urban planning policies should be adopted, given minimal fiscal resources and weak institutions (Glaeser, 2013) .
Conditions in existing primate cities could improve with urban infrastructure and renewal projects (World Bank, 2009 ). But often-prevalent growth constraints of non-primate cities could also be removed (Henderson, 1982; Christiaensen, Weerdt & Todo, 2013; Christiaensen & Todo, 2013) . The demographic contributions to today's urban growth and urbanization highlighted in this paper make these questions only more pertinent. Notes: This figure plots the crude rate of birth, the crude rate of death and the crude rate of natural increase (per 1,000 people) for the rural and urban areas of Industrial Europe (1700 Europe ( -1950 . This figure also plots the decomposition of annual urban growth (%) into the respective contributions of annual urban natural increase (%) and annual residual migration (%). Europe includes Belgium, England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States for this figure. See the Web Appendix for data sources. 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s in rows 1-4, and the period 1960-2010 in rows 5-8. Robust SEs (clustered at the country level in rows 1-4); * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In rows 1-4 and 5-8, the dependent variable is the change in the urbanization rate (%) in decade t and 1960-2010 (divided by 5 in order to be expressed in decadal terms), respectively. The variable of interest is the urban crude rate of natural increase (%) in decade t (rows 1-4), the 1960s (rows 5-6) and the 2000s (rows 7-8). See text for specification details and Web Appendix for data sources. (2000) A.15 Table 5 : Alternative Identification Strategies A.15 Table 6 : Urban Birth Rates, Religiosity and Family Planning Effort (1960s) A.16 Table 7 : Family Planning, Religion and Urban Growth, Cross-Section (1960s)
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A. 1
WEB THEORY APPENDIX Urban Natural Increase and the Speed of Urbanization Summary: This Web Theory Appendix shows in a calibration exercise that faster changes in urbanization are indeed mechanically associated with higher urban rates of natural increase ceteris paribus. Rural natural increase then mechanically lowers urbanization rates.
The urbanization rate at the start of year t, U t , is the ratio of the urban population U pop t to the total population Pop t . The change in urbanization in year t can be expressed as: 
Substituting equations (3) and (4) into equation (8), and noting that Pop t = N ni t * Pop t with N ni t the national rate of natural increase in year t, and Pop t the total population at the start of year t, we obtain:
Three insights emerge. First, the change in urbanization is a relative concept and depends on both urban and rural natural increase (U ni t −Rni t ), with the latter mitigating the positive effect of the former. Consequently, rapid urban natural increase can coexist with a relatively slow change in urbanization. Put differently, countries with similar changes in urbanization may be experiencing very different rates of urban growth, if higher rates of urban natural increase are offset to a similar extent by higher rates of rural natural increase. As countries with higher urban natural increase also tend to experience higher rural natural increase (U ni t and Rni t tend to be highly correlated) this is not so far-fetched. This contrasts with urban growth, where urban natural increase translates one to one in urban growth (at least in an accounting sense and contemporaneously -see further below). Urban congestion is thus likely also more directly linked to urban growth than to changes in the rate of urbanization, a point we will revisit below.
Second, the effect of migration on changes in urbanization tends to be larger than the effect of urban natural increase. Not only is the effect of the latter mitigated by rural natural increase (typically even overturned if Rni t exceeds U ni t ), it is further conditioned by the A. 2 share of the rural population ((1-U t )≤1). From this perspective, it is unsurprising that debates about urbanization (and development) largely ignore demographic factors and focus on migration. The latter affects changes in urbanization most.
Finally, the contribution of urban national increase is conditioned by the nonlinear relationship with the initial level of urbanization U t . To gauge the effect of urban natural increase, we simulate equation (11) using the following parameters: Rni = 2.5% and M i g/U pop = 1.5% per year. These values are inspired by the comparative analysis in section 3.6. U ni = 0.5% is chosen as the benchmark, to see how raising the urban rate of natural increase to 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3 alters urbanization for different initial rates of urbanization (see Web Theory Appendix Figure 1 ). The effects can be large; increasing the urban rate of natural increase from 0.5% to 3% raises the change in urbanization by 0.5 percentage points a year on average. Moreover, the effects of natural increase on the speed of urbanization increase until the initial rate of urbanization approaches 50 percent, after which they decline. The higher speed of urbanization observed in developing countries is thus partly also driven by their low points of departure.
Europe and the four developing areas then widely differed in their urban rates of natural increase. On average, their rural rates of natural increase were much more similar: 2% in Europe and Asia, and 2.5% in other regions. Migration rates were also constant across space and time. In Web Theory Appendix Figure 1 , the simulations use the following parameters: Rni = 2.5% and M i g/U pop = 1.5%. Taking U ni = 0.5% as a benchmark, we show the results for five values of U ni = {1; 1.5; 2; 2.5; 3}, given an initial urbanization rate (U). This allows us to compare the potential effects of urban natural increase ceteris paribus for East Asia (U ni ≈ 1%), Asia (1.5%), the LAC region (2%), the MENA region (2.5%), and Africa (3%), relative to Europe (0.5%). The decadal effects could be large (e.g., 2 points of urbanization for Africa, given an initial urban rate of 10%).
Web Theory Appendix Figure 1: Urban Natural Increase and Change in Urbanization Rate, Calibration
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the change in the urbanization rate in year t (∆U t , in percentage points) and the urban crude rate of natural increase in year t (U ni t , per 100 people), given the initial urbanization rate at the start of year t (U t ). We assume that the rural crude rate of natural increase (Rni t ) = 2.5% and the residual migration rate (M i g t ) = 1.5% per year. We use U ni = 0.5% as a benchmark. This allows us to compare the "relative" effects of the urban rate of natural increase on the change in the urbanization rate for various relatively higher values of U ni = {1; 1.5; 2; 2.5; 3}.
A. 3
WEB DATA APPENDIX Summary: This Web Data Appendix describes in details the data we use in our analysis.
Sample Selection for Industrial Europe and Today's Developing World:
We use three different samples in our analysis. First, we obtain historical urban data for 19 European and North American countries from 1700-1950, and 116 Africa, Asian or non-North American countries that were still developing countries in 1960, from 1960-2010. We exclude from our analysis the European and Neo-European countries for which we could not find historically consistent urban data, as well as the former CIS countries. We use these countries to describe urban patterns in "Industrial Europe" (which also includes a Neo-European country, the United States) and four developing areas: Sub-Saharan Africa (which we call "Africa"), Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Middle-East and North Africa (MENA). Second, our main sample consists of 40 of these countries from 1700 to 2010. These are the countries for which we found historical demographic data. Historical consistent data was not found for other countries. The list of countries and years (or periods) for which we have data is reported in Web Appendix Tables 1, 2 
Urban and Rural Growth and Urbanization Rates in Industrial Europe:
The annual urban growth rate is the average growth rate of the urban population between two years (%). The annual rural growth rate is the average growth rate of the rural population between two years (%). The urbanization rate is defined as the share of the urban population in total population (%). We use Bairoch (1988) and Malanima and Volckart (2007) to reconstruct consistent annual urban growth rates and urbanization rates for 18 Western European countries and the United States for the following periods: 1700-1750, 1750-1800, 1800-1850, 1850-1910 and 1910-1950 . Averages are estimated using the population weights for the same period. We consider 7 countries in our main urban demographic analysis (listed in Web Appendix Table 1) , as consistent historical demographic data could not be found for the 12 other countries.
Urban and Rural Growth and Urbanization Rates in Today's Developing World:
We reference Bairoch (1988), Sluglett (2008) and WUP (2011) to reconstruct the average annual urban growth rates (%) and urbanization rates (%) for Africa, Asia and the LAC and MENA regions for the following periods: 1900-1920, 1920-1930, 1930-1950, 1950-1960, 1960-1970, 1970-1980, 1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 . For the last six decades (post-1950), we use data for 116
African, Asian and non-North American countries. Averages are estimated using the population weights for the same period. We only consider 35 countries in the panel analysis from A. 4
(listed in Web Appendix 
Urban and Rural Demographic Transitions in Industrial Europe:
For each of the 7 countries of Industrial Europe, we use various historical sources to obtain the national, urban and rural crude rates of birth, crude rates of death and crude rates of natural increase (per 1,000 people) for several decades during the 1800-1910 period (sources listed in Panel A, Web
Appendix Table 3 ). For England, our main country of analysis, we have data from 1700 to 1950.
For the other countries, demographic data exists for shorter periods, as this type of data was not systematically collected by the official authorities before the 19th century. 
Urban and Rural Demographic Transitions in Today's Developing World:
Data for the Instrumental Variables:
Data on the population shares (%) of "Catholicism", "Protestantism", "Other Christian Religions", "Islam", "Hinduism", "Buddhism", "Other Eastern Religions", and "Other Religions" for the 1960s
come from Barro and McCleary (2003) . They mostly rely on survey data from the 1960s but label this round of data as "1970". Data on the "Family Planing Effort" (FPE) index (from 0 to 100) for the 1960s comes from Ross and Mauldin (1996) . They mostly rely on observations from the late 1960s, but label this round of data "1972" in their analysis. The two data sets allow us to observe the initial cultural and policy conditions in our 35 developing countries.
Measures of Urban and Rural Congestion:
Data on the share of the urban population living in slums (%) comes from UN-Habitat ( living area, (ii) structural quality, (iii) access to improved water source, and (iv) access to improved sanitation facilities. We have data for 113 countries in total, but we only focus on 95 countries for which we also have data on urban natural increase in 2000. Data is available for a lower number of countries for some subcomponents of the slum variable. UN-Habitat (2003) reports the share of urban residents that lack "sufficient-living area" (%), i.e. who live in dwelling units with more than 3 persons per room. We use as a measure of "structural quality" the share of urban inhabitants who live in a residence with a finished floor (%). We reconstruct this variable using the International
Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, 2013) and the stat compiler of the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS, 2013) . Data on the share of urban inhabitants who have access to an improved water source and improved sanitation facilities (%) comes from WB (2013). A household is considered to have access to an improved water source if it has sufficient amount of water for family use, at an affordable price, available to household members without being subject to extreme effort, especially to women and children. A household is considered to have access to improved sanitation, if an excreta disposal system is available to household members. Data on the urban child dependency ratio (%), the urban aged dependency ratio (%), the urban total dependency ratio (%), and the urban share of 6-15 year-old children that are currently attending school (%) was recreated using the DHS (2013) "agriculture", "mining", "public utilities", "manufacturing", "construction", "wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants", "transportation, storage and communications", "finance, insurance, real estate and business services", "government services", "education and health" and "personal and other services" (our sector of analysis, since it often works as an urban refugee sector). Lastly, we use the same sources to recreate the same measures of congestion for the rural sector only in 2000-2010.
Data is missing for three measures then: sufficient-living area, particulate matter (PM) concentrations and the employment share of the rural refugee sector, which is not necessarily the "personal and other services" sector. We also have data for a fewer number of observations for the rural sector than for the urban sector.
A. 6
Per Capita GDP and Other Controls:
We have GDP per capita every ten years for 1960-2010. The main variable used in our analysis is average log GDP per capita for each decade (constant 2005 international $). We use various sources to reconstruct a range of time-invariant or time-varying controls at the country-level. In the panel regressions, we include the time-varying controls (estimated in the same or previous decade). In the cross-sectional regressions, we also include the time-invariant controls (the time-varying controls are estimated for 1960-2010 instead of for the same or previous decade). First, we consider various rural push factors: (i) FAO (2013) reports the cereal yields (hg per ha) for each country-year observation.
We then estimate the average yields for each decade; (ii) Rural density is defined as the ratio of rural population (1000s) to arable area (sq km). The arable area of each country is reported by FAO (2013) to obtain the average share of natural resource exports in GDP (%) for each decade; (iii) We use the Polity IV data series to calculate the average combined polity score for each country for each decade (Polity IV 2013b). We create an indicator whose value is one if the average polity score is lower than -5, the threshold for not being considered autocratic; and (iv) From WB (2013), we know the share of the largest city in the urban population, the primacy rate, for all years in 1960-2010. Third, we use the other following controls: (i) The 97 countries use four different types of urban definition in their most recent censuses: (a) "administrative cities" are administrative centers of territorial units (e.g., provinces, districts, etc.), (b) "threshold cities" are localities whose population is greater than a population threshold of X inhabitants (e.g.,5,000 or 2,500), (c) "administrative or threshold cities" are either administrative centers or localities whose population is greater than a population threshold, and (d) "threshold with condition cities" are localities whose population is greater than a population threshold and who have a large share of the labor force engaged in non-agricultural activities. We create dummies for each definition. For each country using a population threshold, we know the threshold and use it as a control in our regressions; and (ii) We create two dummies equal to one if the country is a small island or if the country is landlocked. We consider an island country small if its area is smaller than 50,000 sq km.
A. A. 14 WEB APPENDIX (1), we regress the urban birth rate (per 100 people) on the urban total fertility rate (the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates), the share of women of reproductive age (15-49 years) in the urban population in 2000, and their product, in 2000. In column (2), we regress the product on the urban total fertility rate and share of women of reproductive age in the urban population. See Web Appendix for data sources and construction of variables. 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 . Robust SEs clustered at the country level; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The specification is the same as in row 2 of Table 4 (see the notes below the Table) . See Web Appendix for data sources. 
WEB APPENDIX
Urban Natural Increase 8.4*** -1.9*** 6.5** (%, 1960-2010) (3.1) (0.60) (3.1) Residual Migration 0.1 -0.8*** -0.8 (%, 1960-2010) (1.5) (0.28) (1.6) Annual Rural Growth Rate 1.8 -1.24* 0.5 (%, 1960-2010) (1.7) (0.6) (1.9)
Observations; Sample Mean 89; 57. Table 4 (see the notes below the Table) . See Web Appendix for data sources. 
Rural Natural Increase 14.1*** -1.4* 12.6*** (%, 1960-2010) (3.9) (0. Table 4 (see the notes below the Table) . See Web Appendix for data sources.
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